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that it will necessarily be so re- * States has often been arbitrary and
gardedin the courts of other States: without due consideration of the
consequences whic.i follow thereEureka Ins. Co. v. Parks, i Cin.
from.
Super. Ct., 574.
A foreign corporation may not,
As has been pointed out by Mr.
MoRAwB=z in his admirable work
however, take advantage of its own
non-compliance with such statutes, on Private Corporations, the priand suit may be brought against it mary object of such statutes is to
notwithstanding such default. Ha- protect parties dealing with these
german v. Empire Slate Co., 97 companies from imposition and to
Pa., 534.
secure jurisdiction over them in the
It has also been held that where local courts, not to render the cona foreign corporation has failed to tracts and dealings of corporations
comply with such statutes any one which have not complied with their
attempting to act as its officer or provisions void and unenforceable.
agent is personally liable on con- Where the statute does not declare
tracts made by him in behalf of the that such a result shall follow from
corporation, though no such pen- such omission, it ought not to be
inferred by the courts. The same
alty is provided by statute: Lasher
v. Stimson, i Adv. Rep. (S. C. of principles which have been applied
Pa.), 208.
in determining the effect of acts of
corporations in excess of their
THE PROPZR CONSTRUCTION 011 chartered powers should govern in
SUCH STATUTB-,S.
deciding the status of contracta
A review of the decisions has led made by corporations which have
the writer to the conclusion that
failed to comply with the provithe construction put upon these sions of such statutes.
statutes by the courts of the various
H. GoxnoN McCoucH.
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It is libelous fier se to print and publish of a person that he "is said
to have been in the workhouse, and to have had a criminal record;" and
I Reported in

33

N. E. Rep., 921.
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though it is the unquestioned right of the press, as of individuals, to
freely criticise and comment upon the official action and conduct of a
public officer, yet false and defamatory words affecting his private character, spoken or published of him as an individual, are not privileged
merely on the kround that they relate to a matter of public interest, and
are spoken or published in good faith.
THE RIGHT TO CRITICISn PUBLIC OFFICERS AND CANDIDATES FOR
OFICE, AND ITS LIMITATIONS.

I. Criticism of Public Officers.It is a well-settled rule of law that
words spoken or published of one in
an office, profession, trade, or business, in relation to that office, profession, trade, or business, which
naturally tend to injure him therein,
are actionable, without proof of
special damage; and for this reason
many expressions which would be
n'o ground for action by a priyate
individual, are per se actionable
when used in regard to one in an
office or business. This is especially
true of public officers whose position renders them peculiarly liable
to attacks of this kind, and whose
tenure of office depends largely
upon publid favor; and not only
will words actionable when used"of
a private person be so when used of
them, but, in addition, any false
imputation of unfitness, misconduct, or corruption in the discharge
of the duties of his office, cast upon
an elective or appointive officer,
which tends to degrade him in the
eyes of the public, to lessen the
emoluments of his office, to expose
him to punishment, or to cause his
removal from office, is actionable
per se: Cmsar v. Curseny, Cro.
Eliz., 3o5; Taylor v. How, Cro.
Eliz., 861; Kemp v. Housgoe, Cro.
Jac., go; Burton v. Tokin, Cro. Jac.,
143; Isham v. York, Cro. Car., r5;
Stuckley v. Bulhead, 4 Coke Rep.,
16a; Strodev. Holmes, Styles, 338;
%Voodruffv. Wooley, I Vin. Abr.,
463; Can v. Osgood, I Lev., 280;

Aston v. Blagrave, I Stra., 617;
Kent v. Pocock, 2 Stra., 1168;
Adams v. Meredew, 3 Y- & J., 219;
Goodburne v. Bowman, 9 Bing.,
532; May v. Brown, 3 B. & C., 113;
Booth v. Briscoe, 2 Q. B. D., 496;
Dole v. Van Rensselaer, x Johns.
Cas., 330; Sanderson v. Caldwell,
45 N. Y., 398; Hook v. Hackney,
I6 S. & R., 385; Stow v. Converse,
3 Conn., 325; Hartford v. State, 96
Ind., 461; Robbins v. Treadway, 2
J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 540; Curtis v.
Mussey, 6 Gray (Mass.), 261; Gove
v. Blethen, 21 Minn., 8o; Lansing
v. Carpenter, 9 Wis., 540; Spiering
v. Andrae, 45 Wis., 330; Cotulla v.
Kerr (Tex.), ii S. W. Rep., Io58.
Such are words imputing bribery
to a justice of the peace: Pepper v.
Gay, 2 Lutw., 1288; Lindsey v.
Smith, 7 Johns. (N. Y.), 36o; to a
commissioner: Moor v. Foster,
Cro. Jac., 65 ; to a state attorney :
Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyler (Vt.),
456; to a judge: Royce v. Maloney,
58 Vt., 437; charging a justice with
partiality: Masham v. Bridges, Cro.
Car., 223; with perverting justice:
Beamond v. Hastings, Cro. Jac.,
240; or with procuring a person to
take a false oath: Chetwind v.
Meeston, Cro. Jac., 3o8; and charging an election officer with fraudulently and corruptly destroying a
vote legally cast: Dodds v. Henry,
9 Mass, 262; or with making a
fraudulent and wilful miscount of
the votes cast: Ellsworth v. Hayes,
71 Wis., 427. In the days when the
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-harsh laws against Roman Catholics were in force in. England, it was
actionable to charge an official with
being a Papist: Clarges v. Rowe, 3
Lev., 3o. But when the words
spoken br published are so far ambiguous that they willbear a reasonable meaning other than the defamatory one imputed to them, they
will not be construed as libelous:
Hollis v. Briscow, Cro. Jac., 58;
Purdy v. Rochester Printing Co.,
,96 N. Y., 372.
There is another general rule,
however,.which comes in conflict
with and often suspends the operation of the former, so far at least
-as public officers are concerned.
This is the rule that any communi-cation or publication made by one
having an interest or duty in regard
to the. subject-matter, to others
having a corresponding interest or
-duty, in good faith and upon probable cause, is considered as privileged by the occasion,- and exoner.ates the person who makes it from
any legal responsibility therefor.
The peculiar applicability of this
-rule.to the case of a public official
is patent. Every member of the
-community, under our system of
government at least, has a direct'
-and personal interest in the proper
administration of each* and every
Ipublic office; and, as a necessary
corollary, possesses the right to
-criticise and comment upon the
official acts of the incumbent freely
-and without liabi-ity so long "as the
criticism is made in good faith and
with due regard to truth, and goes
no further than 'the occasion war-rants, even though the criticism
and comment be founded on a
mistaken view of the situation:
Kelly v. Tinling, i L. R. Q. B., 699;
Henwood v. Harrison, 7 L. R. C. P.,
6o6; Crane v. Waters, Io Fed. Rep.,
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619; Miner v. Detroit Post and
Tribune Co., 49 Mich., 358; Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 31 W. N.
C., 389. "Provided a man, whether
in a newspaper or not, publishes
a comment on a matter of public
interest, fair in tone and temperate,
although he may express opinions
that you may not agree with,
that is not a subject for an action.
for libel, because whoever fills a
public position renders himself
open to public discussion, and if
any part of his public acts is wrong,
he must accept the attack as a
necessary though unpleasant circumstance attaching to his position :" Kelly v. Sherlock, i L. R.
Q. B., on p. 689.
This freedom of criticism, however, is confined to fair comment
upon the Tofflcial acts of its object,
and does not permit or justify, under the guise of criticism, an assault upon hisprivate character.
The imputation of base, unworthy
or corrupt motives, if false, is not.
privileged; for the falseness of the
charge is prima fade evidence of
malice, and malice will render even
the truth actionable. "A person
who enters upon a public office, or
becomes a candidate for one, no
more surrenders to the public his
private character than his private
property :" Post Pub. Co. v. Moloney (Ohio), 33 N. R. Rep., 921
(the principal case). " There is a
broad distinction between fair and
legitimate discussion in regard to
the conduct of a public man, and
the imputation of corrupt motives,'
by which that conduct may be supposed to be governed. And if one
goes out of his way to asperse the
personal character of a public man,
and to ascribe to him base and corrupt motives, he must do so at his
peril:" Negley v. Farrow, 6o Md.,
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158. One case, Seymour v. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372, seems opposed to this view, and holds that
the private character of a public
officer may be criticised when it
tends to prove or disprove his fit,ness for the place he-holds. But
this must be understood as quali-fled by the condition that the criticism"be true in order to be justifiable, for such is the unanimous doctrine of the other cases: Parmiter
v. Coupland, 6 M. & W., io5;
French v. Vifquaim, ii Neb., 280;
Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns.
(N. Y.), 264; Cramer v. Riggs, 17
Wend., 2zo; Hamilton v. Eno, 81
N. Y., 116; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa.,
385; Wilson v. Noonan, ig Wis.,
165; Prosser v. Callis (Ind.), 19
N, E. Rep., 735; Bourreseau v. Detroit Evening Journal (Mich.), 3o

proved acts of a public man, and
quite another to assert that he has.
been guilty of particular acts of'
misconduct :" Davis v. Shepstone,
ii App. Cas., i87. The false.ness.
of the charge is the basis of responsibility. A falsehood is.never
privileged: State v. Schmitt, 49
N. J. L., 579; Briggs v. Garrett,
Ii

Pa.,

404.

Whoever makes

such a- charge, therefore, is liable;
and it makes no difference whether
he believed in the truth of it or
not. That belief cannot affect his.
responsibility; if it has any effect
on the matter whatever it can only
go to mitigate the damages. •It ishis business to ascertain the truth
of the charge before he gives it tothe world: Harle v. Catherall, 14
L. T. (N. S.), 8oi; Canpbell v.
Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S., 769; WilN. W. Rep., 376; Augusta Ev. son v. Reed, 2 F. & F., 149; WoodNews v. Radford (Ga.), 17 S. E. ard v. Dowsing, 2 Mann & Ry., 74;
Rep,, 612; Collins v. Dispatch Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W., 488;
McDonald v. Woodruff, 2 DilL
Pub. Co., 3i W. N. C., 316.
(U. S.), 244; Russell v. Anthony,
It is equally, or perhaps even
morunjustifiable, to falsely charge 21 Kans., 450; Com. v. Clap, 4
a public man with specific acts 6f Mass., 163; Com. v. Wardwell, 13&
malfeasance in office, for this not Mass., 164; Poster v. Scripps, 39
only involves an assault upon his Mich., 376; Larrabee v. Minn.
private character, but cannot even Tribune Co., 36 Minn., 141; Littleclaim the excuse of being a reason- john v. Greeley, I3Abb. Pr. (N.Y.),
"The right of 4i; Henderson v. Commercial Adable inference.
criticism upon the conduct of a vertiser, 46 Hun. (N. Y.), 04; S. C.,
public officerdoes not embrace any
aff., ixii N. Y., 685; Re Moore, 63
N. C., 397; Eviston v. Cramer, 57
right to make a false statement of
his acts, involving his integrity or
Wis., 57o; Rowand v. De Camp,
96 Pa., 493.
-faithfulness in the discharge of his
The whole subject is very well
duties:" Hay v. Reid (Mich.), 48
N. W. Rep., 507. "The distinc- summed up in the following extion cannot be too clearly borne in tract from the opinion of Judge
mind between comments or criti- TRUNxzy in Neeb v. Hope, iii
cism and allegations of fact. stich Pa., 145: "The conduct of publicofficers is open to public criticism,
as that disgraceful acts have been
cominitted, or discreditable lan- and it is for the interest of society
guage used. It is one thing to that their acts may be freely published with fitting comments or
comment upon or criticise, even
strictures. But a line must bewith severity, the acknowledged or
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-drawn between hostile criticism
upon public conduct and the imputation of bad motives, or of criminal offences, where such motives
-or offences cannot be justly and
reasonably inferred from the conduct. A man has no right to impute to another, whose conduct is
open to ridicule or disapprobation,
base, sordid or wicked motives,
unless there is so much ground for
the imputation that a jury shall
find not only that he had an honest
belief in the truth of his state-ments, but that this belief was not
without foundation. When the
conduct of a public man is open
to animadversion, and the writer
who is commenting upon it makes
imputations on his motives which
arise fairly and legitimately out of
his-conduct, so that a jury shall
say that the criticism was not only
honest, but well founded, 'an action is not maintainable."
But while public criticisms on
public men must be fair, and have a
reasonable foundation in order to
be privileged, a wider protection is
given to memorials or petitions
addressed to those in authority,
praying for the removal of inferior
-officers, or the redress of fancied
grievances. Wlen these are preferred to the proper authority they
.arefirimafacieprivileged, and ex-pressmalice must be shown before
that privilege can be taken away:
Lake v. King, i Lev., 240; Wood-ward v. Lander, 6 C. & P., 548;
Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & BI., 344;
White v. Nicholls, 3 How. (U. S.),
266; Young v. Richardson, 4 Ill.
App., 364; Thorn v. Blanchard, 5
Johns. (N. Y.), 508; Van Wyck v.
•Guthrie, 4 Duer. (N. Y.), 268; Van
Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N.,Y., i9o;
'Kent v. Bongartz, 15 R. I., 72;
Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler
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(Vt.), 129; Larkin v. Noonan, 19'
Wis., 82. Contra, Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick., 379. - But if malice
is shown, the mere fact that it is
vented through a petition will not
privilege the publication: Howard
v. Thompson, 21 Wend. (N. Y.),
319. Whenever a person "under
the insidious mask of consultingthe public welfare, renders the investigation of the conduct of a
public officer the mere vehicle of
private malevolence, and a jury on
the trial shall be fully satisfied that
the publication was wanton and
malicious, and without probable
cause, he has no pretensions to
escape unpunished:" Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R., 23. Malice in
publishing a petition may be inferred where it was printed and
circulated, but never in fact presented to the legislature: State v;
Burnham, 9 N. H., 34. If presented to the wrong party, however,
under a bonafide mistake, it will
still be privileged: King v. Bayley,
3 Bac. Abr., Tit. Libel, A. 2; Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald., 642; McIntyre v. McBean, 13 U. C. Q. B.,
534. Contra, Blagg v. Sturt, io
Q. B., 899.
II. Criticism of Candidates for
has been frequently
Office. -It
claimed that a much broader
license of criticism exists with regard to candidates for office than
is conceded with respect to those
holding office. It is said that the
very fact of candidacy puts the
character of the candidate in issue,
so far as his 'qualifications. and fitness for the office are concerned,
and the publication of the truth in
this regard cannot injure him,
because the public have a right to
be informed of the character of
those who seek their votes: Comm.
v. Clap, 4 Mass., 163; Comm. v.
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Odell, 3 Pitts. (Pa.), 449; Mayrant
v, Richardson, z Nott & McC., 347.
This much is cheerfully conceded;
'bnt the.further claim; made in a
fe -cases, that the publication of
falsehood concerning a candidate
is privileged if made with an
honest belief in its truth, is opposed to every principle of right
and justice, and is borne down by
an overwhelming weight of authority. "It would be a strange doctrine indeed,' said Chief Justice
MANSFIELD in Harwood v. Astley,
r Bo§. & PuL, N. R. 47, "that
when a man stands for the most
hionorable situation in the country,
any. person may accuse him of any
imaginable crime with impunity."
The fallacy of such a doctrine is
clearly exposed in Bronson v.
Bruce, 59 Mich., 467: "It'would
deter all sensitive and honorable
men from accepting the candidacy
to oice, and leave the field to the
profligate, the uiprincipled and
unworthy; to men who have no
character to lose, no reputation to
blemish. It could scarcely be epected that any man worthy of the
position would consent to stand
for an office and have his reputation tarnished, his good name
scandalized, in the face of the
whole community, if such. a doctrine as this is to prevail. Besides,
under the - guise of*assisting the
.people to select a fit man, the
voters are deceived by falsehood,
and induced to withhold their support from the maligned candidate,
and so two wrongs are perpetrated
-one
upon the candidate, the
other in misleading the voter."
To the same effect are most of the
cases: Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 C.
& P., 222; Wisdom v. Brown, i
Times L. R., 412; Pankhurst v.
Hamilton, 3 Times L. R., 500;

Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla., 431 ;
Comm. v. Wardwell, 136 Mass.,
164; Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.,
9 Minn., 133; Smith v. Burrms.

(Mo.), 16 S. W. Rep., 881; Wheaton
v. Beecher, 66 Mich-, 307, S. C., 33
N. W. Rep., 503; Lewis v. Few, 5
Johns, x; Root v. King, 7 Cow.,.
613; King v. Root, 4 Wend., 113 ;
Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend., 63 ;
Turrill v. Dolloway, 17 Wend.,
426 (but see S. C. 26 Wend., 383) Harwood v. Keech, 4 Hun. (N. Y.),.
389; Seely v. Blair (two cases),
Wright (Ohio) 358 and 683; Vanarsdale v. Laverty, 69 Pa., io3;
Brewer v. Weakley, 2 Overton
(Tenn.), 99; Banner Pub. Co. v
State, 16Lea. (Tenn.), 176; Sweeney
v. Baker, 13 W. Va., 158. The
boasted liberty of the press, even,
has been invoked to spread its
aegis over this wanton attempt to.
.violate the honor of humanity;.
but to no purpose: Jones v. Townsend, supra; Sweeney v. Baker,
supra.
This being the weight of authority, it is, perhaps, worth while to.
examine the cases which make
against it: State v. Balch, 31 Kans.,
465, was a criminal case, and, of'
course, lack of criminal intent
could be shown, and Marks zv.
Baker, 28 Minn., 162, bears clearproof of the existence of probablecause, so that whatever else wassaid in either was but a dictum.
The others simply claim that a.
man should not be held responsible
for what he publishes bona fide,
upon probable cause and with an
honest belief in its truth, even
though it be in fact untrue: Mott
v. Dawson, 46 Iowa, 533; Bays v.
Hunt, 6o Iowa, 251; Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex., 354;
Briggs v. Garrett, i ix Pa., 4o4.

this contention correct?

Is-
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The answer depends upon what
is meant by probable cause. If by
that is meant information picked
up anywhere and anyhow, the
answer is most decidedly in the
negative. In these days of so-called
political methods, by which name it
is sought to cover the nakedness of
everything that is base, dishonorable and unmanly, no man has a
right to rely upon what is told him
to the discredit of a candidate for
office without making some independent effort to ascertain the
truth of the report. Who is to be
believed when a gentleman of high
social position, proprietor of a
widely read and influential newspaper, acknowledges that he knew
a report printed thereiiu to be false
when it was published,but excuses
himself on the ground that it was
during a campaign? As if that
could justify a lie !
This was the fundamental error
into which the Court fell in Briggs
v. Garrett, iiX Pa., 4o4. Mr. Garrett was chairman of an organization intended to purify politics in
the city of Philadelphia, known as
the "Committee of One Hundred,"
and at one of the public meetings
of that body, at which several reporters were present, he handed the
secretary a letter which he had received from a citizen of Philadelphia, containing a serious but false
imputation upon the honor and
character of Judge Briggs, then a
candidate, and requested him to
read it aloud. Tfiis was done.
There was no question as to the
purity of Mr. Garrett's motives;
but there was also no proof that he
knew the writer of the letter, and
every proof that he made no effort
to discover whether the charge
made was true or false, whereas he
could have easily discovered its
falsity. The Supreme Court, start-
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ing out with the undeniable principle that no lie is privileged, devoted considerable labor to a very
brilliant and specious effort to
prove that this. particular lie was.
privileged because it came at second
hand. But this has been very fully
refuted in Banner Publishing Co.
v. State, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 176, in an
opinion which, unhappily, is too
long to quote, and, moreover, failed
to meet the approbation of the
three most able judges on the
bench-Chief Justice MPRCUR and
Justices GORDON and STRRYzrT.
It would be hard to find any prin-,
ciple that will support it. A lie is.
a lie, by whomsoever made; and
he who asserts a fact to be true,
without knowing it to be so,, is as.
guilty of falsehood as he who
asserts a fact to be true that he'
knows to be not true. By themethod of publication adopted,
Mr. Garrett made the falsehood'
contained in the letter his own,
and the case was aggravated by his.
neglect to inquire into its truth .
for had he done so, and discovered
its falsity, he would never have
given it to the world. On every
ground, then, the authority of
Briggs v. Garrett fails; and there is
no good reason for abandoning the
doctrine of -the majority of the
cases, unless we qualify it by admitting probable cause (not probable surmise) as an element of
privilege in cases where the statement is made on reliable authority,
and there are no means of investigating its . truth. Where such
means exist, no bare reliance upon
the word of another should ever,
in such a case, be allowed to estiblish probable cause.
The very
neglect to use the means of investigation within reach is a clear proof
of want of good faith.
But though it cannot wholly ex-
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oner4te, alleged good faith in thus
attacking the character of a candidate may go in mitigation of damages. "There should be no unreasonable responsibility where
. there is no actual malice :" Bailey
Sv. Kalamazoo Pub. Co., 40 Mich.,
Mich.,
55x; Bronson v. Bruce, 5g9
"67; Belknap v. Ball (Mich.), 47
"-R.
W. Rep., 674. But this is denied
in Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill., 77.
When a candidate is seeking an
appointive office, the communication should be made to the person
or persons in whom the power of
appointment is vested; and a communication made to the public
through a newspaper in regard to
a caididate for such an office does
not stand on the same footing of
privilege as if made to the appointing power: Hunt v. Bennett, i9 N.
Y., 173.
Finally, the right of criti s of
public officers and candidates for
public office maybe thus defined:
Any one has a right to criticise
and comment upon the official acts
and qualifications of an officer
or candidate, freely and fully,
provided it be done fairly and in
good iaith and be kept within the
bounds of truth, no matter how
injurious that truth may be; but
no one has any right to criticise or

comment upon the private life or
character of an officer or candidate,
except so far as the same may affect
his fitness for the office he holds, or
aspires to hold, and even then he
cannot claim privilege if his criticism or comment be made unfairly
or untruthfully. Still less has any
one a right to charge an officer or
candidate falsely with acts injurious
to his reputation, and even a claim
of probable cause cannot save the
accuser, unless he have made some
honest effort to ascertain the truth
of the charge. If he heedlessly
repeats a charge made by another,
his good faith and claim of probable
cause cannot wholly exonerate him.
They can only go in mitigation of
damages.
[No=:.-There is a very interesting and instructive article on
" Criticism and Fair Comment,"
by CHARLES C. TOWNSEND, Esq.,
with an accompanying note by A.
R. HAIG, 1sq., published in 3o Am.
Lfw Reg., 517, to which, though
their conclusions differ somewhat
from those reached above, the
reader is referred for a discussion
of the broad subject, of which
only a minor division is treated in
the preceding annotation.]
R. D. S.

